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HOWARD v. MOORE
131 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACT S
On August 29, 1985, Chinh Le disappeared on her way
home from work in Greenville, South Carolina. Ronnie
Howard confessed multiple times to her murder, the first
confession occurring on October 3, 1985. Howard and his
co-defendant, Dana Weldon, were tried and convicted of
murder on June 5, 1986, and subsequently sentenced to
death.The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld Howard's
death sentence on direct appeal.'The United States Supreme
Court denied Howard's petition for certiorarP and his peti-
tion for rehearing.4 The state court denied Howard post-con-
viction relief,5 and the South Carolina Supreme Court denied
certiorari,6 as did the United States Supreme Court.7
Howard filed this habeas corpus action in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina on
September 17, 1993.8 The state's motion for summary judg-
ment was granted on June 16, 1995, and Howard appealed
to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit.9
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that: 1) Howard's confession was admissible;'0
2) the redactions of the confession were proper in both the
guilt phase" and the penalty phase;'2 3) section 106 of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct ("AEDPA") did
not apply to Howard's case; 3 4) there was no valid claim of
juror discrimination;' 4 5) the failure to repeat the manslaugh-
ter jury instruction did not prejudice defendant;' 5 6) Howard
'State v.Howard, 369 S.E.2d 132, 134 (S.C. 1988).
"Howard, 369 S.E. 20 at 138.
'Howard v. South Carolina, 490 U.S. 1113 (1989).
"Howard v. South Carolina, 492 U.S. 932 (1989).
5Howard v.Moore, 131 E3d 399,406 (4th Cir. 1997).
Howard, 131 E30 at 406.
7Howard v. South Carolina, 508 U.S. 917 (1993).




"Howard, 131 E3d at 420.
'31d.at 403.
"Id.at 406.
"1Id.at 420. Howard alleged that, upon a request by the jury
that the judge repeat the murder instruction, it was error for the
judge not to also repeat the manslaughter instruction.The court of
appeals found that, even were the claim not defaulted for lack of a
contemporaneous objection," [w]e readily dismiss Howard's claim,
concluding that Howard was in no way prejudiced by the trial
court's refusal to recharge a manslaughter instruction that was not
requested and previously had been charged: Id.
had no valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim;' 6 7) the
prosecutor made no improper comment on defendant's fail-
ure to testify at the sentencing hearing;' 7 and 8) no imper-
missible ex parte communication between the prosecutor
and the jury occurred. 8
ANALYSIS/APPUCATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Claims Regarding Howard's Confession
A. The Edwards Claim
On September 12, 1985, Howard was arrested on a
charge unrelated to the murder of Le. On September 16,
defense counsel was appointed for Howard, and on
October 2, Howard's defense counsel made it clear to all
authorities involved that Howard would not make any state-
ments. On October 3, Howard, still in police custody and
without the presence of counsel, met with his parole offi-
cer, Polk, and confessed to the murder of Le. During the con-
versation, Howard asked to be put in touch with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), in the hope that his confes-
sion may enable him to receive lesser punishments for his
crimes. On October 7 and 8, Howard, still without the ben-
efit of counsel, met with Agent Battle of the FBI, signed
waivers of his rights under Miranda v.Arizona19 and con-
fessed to the murder of Le in great detail.
20
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Howard argued that his confession should
be suppressed because it was obtained in violation of
Edwards v.Arizona.21 The basic holding of Edwards is that
"an accused .... having expressed his desire to deal with the
'6Howard, 131 E3d. at 421.
1 Id.
"Id. at 422. In order to provide the jury with writing paper in
the jury room, the county clerk created bound pads of paper from
scrap paper on hand. However, the clerk's source of scrap paper
was old letters from the prosecutor to former jury members,
thanking them for their service.
The court of appeals looked to United States v. Cheek, 94 E3d
136 (4th Cir. 1996) for guidance. Cheek stated that in order for a
party to establish a prima facie case for ex parte juror contact, the
party must introduce competent evidence that there was an extra-
judicial communication or contact, and that it was "'more than
innocuous interventions.'" Cheek, 94 E3d at 141 (quoting Haley v.
Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 E3d 1532, 1537 n.9 (4th Cir. 1986)).
In Howard's case the court found that"the form letters were noth-
ing 'more than innocuous interventions." Howard, 131 E3d at 422
(quoting Cheek, 94 E3d at 141).
'9384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"'Howard, 131 E3d at 404.
21451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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police only through counsel, is not subject to further inter-
rogation by authorities until counsel has been made avail-
able to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police"2 Howard contended that he did not initiate the
meeting with Polk, and thus the resulting confession violat-
ed Edwards and could not be admitted against him. In fact,
the confession to Polk was not used against Howard, rather
it was the subsequent confession to Battle, made possible
by the Polk-Howard interrogation, that was admitted against
Howard. Howard argued to the court of appeals that the
confession to Battle should also have been suppressed
because it was a fruit of the poisonous tree,23 existing only
because of the Edwards violation that occurred when Polk
interrogated Howard.
24
The dissent stated that the factual issue of who initiat-
ed the Polk-Howard meeting should be remanded to district
court for determination.2 In contrast, the majority held
"that it is immaterial whether Polk's interrogation of
Howard constituted an Edwards violation ... .The 'tainted
fruits' doctrine is simply inapplicable absent a constitution-
al violation" 26 The question of whether a violation of the
prophylactic rule is a violation of the underlying (in this
case constitutional) rule was addressed in Michigan v.
Tucken~rThere, the Court established that a violation of the
Miranda rules2 is not necessarily a violation of the Fifth
Amendment, but rather a violation of the prophylactic rules
designed to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights.The Howard majority stated that "an Edwards viola-
tion, like a Miranda violation, is not itself a constitutional
violation,"29 rather it is a mere technical violation of a pro-
phylactic rule.
The criminal defense bar should be very careful to note
that the majority's opinion seriously curtails the application
of Edwards in the Fourth Circuit.The dissent describes the
circumvention of Edwards created by the majority:
22Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
"See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding
that the"fruits" of police conduct which actually infringed a defen-
dant's FourthAmendment rights must be suppressed).The rule of
Wong Sun has been expanded beyond the Fourth Amendment,
encompassing the Fifth Amendment.
24Howard, 131 E3d at 411.
251d. at 426 (Michael,J, dissenting).
16Id. at 413.
'7417 U.S. 433 (1974).
2In particular, the Court stated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966), that in a custodial interrogation, "[p]rior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evi-
dence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed: Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
The Court further stated that the defendant could waive these
rights, but any waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently." Id. Any statements made outside the bounds of
Miranda may not be used against the person by the state. Id.
29Howard, 131 E3d at 414.
Even though a jailed suspect has invoked his right
to counsel, the police can now send in an inter-
rogator who gets a confession (without counsel
present) that is not coerced under traditional Fifth
Amendment analysis.This allows the police to send
in (still without counsel present) additional inter-
rogators who get Miranda waivers and new,
"untainted" confessions. The later confessions are
admissible because the first was not coerced, even
though all were obtained in blatant violation of
Edwards.
The dissent's position has unequivocal support within
the Edwards decision itself. In Edwards, Edwards invoked
his Miranda rights by requesting counsel.The police later
initiated an interrogation of Edwards without his counsel
present, obtained a confession, and used it to convict him.1
The United States Supreme Court declared that "the use of
Edward's confession against him at his trial violated his
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments... ,32
This statement, made after the Tucker decision, certainly
casts doubt on the continued validity of the Tucker hold-
ing. Though the court of appeals' decision in Howard
appears to be in direct contradiction to the United States
Supreme Court's statement in Edwards, counsel should be
aware of the court of appeals' interpretation, as it is cur-
rently controlling in the Fourth Circuit. Counsel should
argue against the court of appeals' interpretation of
Edwards so as to preserve the issue for appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
B. The Redacted Confessions in the Guilt Phase
Howard was tried jointly with his co-defendant, Dana
Weldon. In accordance with Bruton v. United States,33 the
prosecutor redacted from Howard's confession the portions
that incriminated Weldon. Howard asserted that the redacted
portions were exculpatory with respect to himself, because
they showed he had no specific intent to kill, and because
they cast doubt on which defendant actually committed the
murder. Noting that under South Carolina law malice afore-
thought can be either express or implied,34 the court held
that "because South Carolina does not require that a defen-
dant have specific intent to commit murder, nothing in
Howard's original [unredacted] confessions was exculpatory
for Fifth Amendment purposes and in no way diminished
Howard's legal blameworthiness for the murder."
35
I"Id. at 426.
3Edwards v.Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,479-80 (1981).
32Id. at 480.
31391 U.S. 123 (1968) (holding that the introduction of a joint-
ly tried, non-testifying co-defendant's statement violates the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause if the statement contains evi-
dence that incriminates the defendant).
-S.C. CodeAnn. § 16-3-10 (Law Co-op 1985) (defining murder
as the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either
express or implied).
3Howard, 131 E3d at 418.
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C. The Redacted Confessions in the Penalty
Phase
Howard asserted to the court of appeals that even if the
redacted version of his confession was admissible at the
guilt phase, the entire confession should have been heard at
the penalty phase.The majority recounted the key portion
of the confession as follows: "Howard stated that he placed
the plastic over Le's head and held her 'until she was still.'
He thought Le was just'playing possum' and claimed that he
'felt a pulse."' Howard then told how Weldon reapplied
pressure with the plastic, and Howard later realized Le was
dead.37 Despite the fact that the confession was evidence
that Howard had no intent to kill Le, the majority agreed
with the trial court judge, and stated that "In] othing in the
redactions altered Howard's personal culpability for Le's
death. [N]othing in the redactions could be construed as
mitigating evidence in Howard's favor:"
These statements by the majority evidence little
respect for the theme that "underlies the Lockett [v. Ohio]"9
and Eddings [v. Oklahoma]4° line of cases: the sentencing
jury alone, armed with the complete story, must decide the
question of the capital defendant's moral culpability"4' Due
to the fact that "'the penalty of death is qualitatively differ-
ent'" than any other sentence, the defendant is given wide
latitude in the introduction of mitigating evidence.4 The
United States Supreme Court has established the general
rule that the jury must consider any mitigating evidence,
that is,"any aspect of a defendant's character or record or
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death:'
43
Though it seems clear that both the trial judge and the
court of appeals "step[ped] into the jury box;' it is equally
clear that both parties felt entitled to do so, and thus will
likely continue to do so in the future. It appears that
defense counsel should be prepared to establish the miti-
gating character of penalty phase evidence to the court as
well as to the jury.
II. Applicability of AEDPA
Following the United States Supreme Court in Lindh v.
Murpby,/' the court stated that the "more deferential stan-
dards of review" set forth in section 106 of theAntiterrorism
16Id. at 418-19 (quoting J.A. at 559).
17Id. at 419.
"Id. at 410-20.
39438 U.S. 586 (1978).
40455 U.S. 104 (1982).
"Howard, 131 E3d at 429 (MichaelJ, dissenting).
"'See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (quoting Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,304 (1976)).
-Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
4"Howard, 131 E3d at 429 (Michael,J, dissenting).
"1117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997).
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA) 46 did not
apply to Howard's appeal.47 Lindh held that the section did
not apply to appeals filed beforeAEDPA was signed into law,
April 26,1996. Howard's appeal was filed prior to that date.
M. A Batson Example
The court of appeals' handling of Howard's claim of a
violation of Batson v. Kentucky4" is a textbook example of
how Batson challenges typically progress. Forty-two per-
sons qualified as jurors through the voir dire process, thirty-
five whites and seven blacks. The prosecutor struck six of
the seven black jurors, but only one of the thirty-five white
jurors.The trial judge agreed with Howard that these facts
established a prima facie case of a Batson violation, but
then found that the prosecutor met its consequent burden
to show a race-neutral reason for striking each juror.9
The court of appeals approved the trial judge's deci-
sion, quoting itself for the proposition that the prosecutors
"explanation need not be 'persuasive, or even plausible: as
long as it is [race] neutral""
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Howard contended that he was denied effective assis-
tance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment"
when defense counsel failed to present mitigating evidence
regarding his adaptability to prison and his military and
school records.52 The court of appeals cited Strickland v.
"Section 106 is codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. 1997).
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
-Howard, 131 E3d at 403.
48476 U.S. 79 (1986).
"'Howard, 131 E3d at 407.
5'Matthews v.Evatt, 105 E3d 907,917 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,786 (1995)).
51In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. Const.Amend.VI.
52Howard, 131 E3d at 420-21.
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Washington5 for the rule that in order" [tlo prove a consti-
tutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defen-
dant must show both that his counsel's representation was
deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency:54In
applying Strickland, the court found that in none of the
challenged decisions was defense counsel deficient under
the Strickland standard. The court opined that Howard's
past prison record would have been a double-edged sword
with the jury, and that Howard's military and school records
"were, at best,'checkered." 5
V. Commentary on Defendant's Failure to Testify
Howard asserted that his Fifth Amendment 6 right
against self-incrimination was violated when the prosecu-
tor, in his closing remarks to the sentencing jury, repeatedly
asked:"Where is the remorse?" 57 Howard claimed that these
"466 U.S. 668 (1984).
"Howard, 131 E3d at 421 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
55Id.
S6No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or pub-
lic danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
statements were an impermissible commentary on his deci-
sion not to testify. The court of appeals disagreed, stating
that "when a prosecutor's comments are merely a 'fair
response to a claim made by a defendant or his counsel"
there is no constitutional violation"5 The court observed
that "those remarks were in direct response to defense
counsel's argument that Howard was remorseful for his
actions. The court concluded that the comments did not
violate Howard's Fifth Amendment rights.
5 9
Summary and analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
U.S. Const. amend.V
57Howard, 131 E3d at 421 (quoting App. at 1612-13).




133 F.3d 915 (4TH CIR. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Randall Hill was killed on January 10, 1990, by three
bullets to the chest and abdomen. Eyewitness testimony
of defendant's wife (also victim's mother) and ballistics
evidence established that Zane Brown Hill ("Hill")
entered the residence of his estranged wife and son
armed with a rifle. Hill introduced evidence that on that
day he had ingested twelve beers, four Darvons, a pain
reliever, and two Flexorils, a muscle relaxant. Randall
Hill, who was in possession of a pistol, attempted to call
the police, but was shot and killed by Hill while in the
process of doing so. Hill then struck his wife with the
butt of the rifle.While he reloaded the rifle, his wife fled
the house. Neighbors testified that Hill shot at his flee-
ing wife but missed her.' Hill was charged and convict-
'State v. Hill, 417 S.E.2d 765,769-70 (N.C. 1992).
2North Carolina General Statute section 14-17 states in perti-
nent part:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or
ed of first-degree murder under North Carolina General
Statute section 14-17.2 He was sentenced to death under
North Carolina General Statute section 15A-2000.1
by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex
offense, robbery, kidnaping, burglary, or other felony
committed or attempted with the use of a deadly
weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first
degree, a Class A felony, and any person who commits
such murder shall be punished with death or imprison-
ment in the State's prison for life without parole as the
court shall determine pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997).
3North Carolina General Statute section 15A-2000 states in perti-
nent part;with respect to the separate sentencing hearingthe following:
After hearing the evidence, argument of counsel
and instructions of the court, the jury shall deliberate
and render a sentence recommendation to the court,
based on the following matters:
(1)Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or
circumstances as enumerated in subsection (e) exist;
